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Abstract— This paper analyzes stability conditions for whole-
sale electricity markets under real-time retail pricing and realis-
tic consumption models with memory, which explicitly take into
account previous electricity prices and consumption levels. By
passing on the current retail price of electricity from supplier
to consumer and feeding the observed consumption back to the
supplier, a closed-loop dynamical system for electricity prices
and consumption arises whose stability is to be investigated.
Under mild assumptions on the generation cost of electricity
and consumers’ backlog disutility functions, we show that, for
consumer models with price memory only, market stability is
achieved if the ratio between the consumers’ marginal backlog
disutility and the suppliers’ marginal cost of supply remains
below a fixed threshold. Further, consumer models with price
and consumption memory can result in greater stability regions
and faster convergence to the equilibrium compared to models
with price memory alone, if consumption deviations from
nominal demand are adequately penalized.
I. INTRODUCTION
With the ever-growing demand for electricity, increased
penetration of inherently volatile renewable energy resources,
and the lack of economical energy storage technologies,
wholesale prices of electricity fluctuate by up to an order
of magnitude during peak and low demand periods. From an
economic perspective, researchers have long been arguing
in favor of real-time electricity pricing to remedy allocative
inefficiencies associated with classic, near-constant energy
tariffs such as Time-of-Use Pricing, see e.g. [1], [2]. In [3],
the authors state practical implications of real-time pricing
such as load flattening and peak shaving. Despite improved
market efficiency of real-time pricing, ratepayers are hesitant
towards their adoption due to possible sudden price spikes
[4]. While we acknowledge the risk aversion of ratepayers,
we neither argue in favor nor against real-time pricing, but
restrict our attention to the analysis of conditions under
which real-time pricing results in stable price evolutions.
The extant body of literature on the dynamics of electricity
markets is rich and multifaceted. A common approach is
load scheduling in a Demand Response setting with time-
varying, exogenous pricing, where the elastic component of
demand, i.e. the shiftable part, is to be optimally satisfied to
minimize cost or, equivalently, maximize utility [5], [6], [7].
Optimal utilization policies and efficiency gains with storage
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are investigated in [8], [9]. [10] has examined a tradeoff
between risk and efficiency under cooperative and non-
cooperative scheduling behavior. These contributions rely on
strong parameterizations of household appliances or agent
arrival processes.
In this paper, we abstract away those assumptions, and
instead model the real-time wholesale electricity market
dynamics as a closed-loop feedback system between the
suppliers’ electricity generation and the consumers’ elec-
tricity consumption, which arises by providing end-users
of electricity with a proxy of the current electricity retail
price. Such systems have been studied and analyzed for
stability in the extant literature, see for example [11] where
the authors investigate theoretical statements on the utility
functions under which the market remains stable, and [12],
which models market dynamics with a system of differential
algebraic equations. However, in these works, the suppliers’
and consumers’ decision on the quantity to generate and
consume, respectively, are explained with invariant cost
functions which remain constant over time. While this is
a tenable assumption for the suppliers’ cost, a dynamic user
consumption model which incorporates previous consump-
tion and electricity prices into the consumption decision
is more suitable to capture time-varying user preferences.
Proposing these dynamic consumption models with memory
is a key contribution of this paper.
More specifically, we formulate the optimal consumption
strategy of suppliers as a constrained finite horizon control
problem that satisfies the Bellman Equation and is solvable
with dynamic programming. At each time step, the user has
the option to defer consumption, but thereby causing backlog
associated with a disutility. In the derivation of these models,
we assume the electricity prices to be exogenous and the
suppliers to be price-taking. The stepwise optimal feedback
policy is then identified as the new consumption model with
memory, as it depends on the current and previous electricity
price as well as potentially the previous consumption. This
consumption model is then used in a closed-loop setting
under the assumption of endogenous prices (in particular,
the supplier is not price taking anymore), to see whether or
not this “endogenous transformation” is stable.
The key observation is that, under mild assumptions, this
consumption model results in price and consumption stability
if and only if the ratio between the consumers’ marginal
backlog disutility and the suppliers’ marginal generation cost
falls below a fixed threshold. This ratio can be increased
by suitably penalizing consumption deviations from the
required, a-priori known demand.
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This paper is organized as follows: In Section II, we
describe the market setting of real-time pricing and the
roles of the suppliers, consumers, and Independent System
Operator, and set up a dynamical system for the temporal
evolution of supply and demand. In Section III, we identify
two memory-based consumption models. Next, Section IV
investigates stability conditions under the memory-based
consumption models within the dynamical system set up in
Section II. Section V concludes the paper.
II. ELECTRICITY MARKET MODEL
In this Section, we describe a model that describes the
market participants, namely the energy suppliers, consumers,
and the independent system operator (ISO), and their inter-
actions that result in a dynamical system whose stability is
to be analyzed in Section IV.
A. Market Participants
1) Suppliers: Each supplier i in the set of suppliers S is
endowed with a cost function ci(·) : R+ 7→ R+, which maps
a production quantity to its associated cost. The suppliers are
price-taking and rational, profit-maximizing agents.
Assumption 1. ci, i ∈ S is convex and increasing.
Let λ denote the unit price of electricity set by the ISO at
which the suppliers are reimbursed. Then, with Assumption
1, supplier i’s production quantity si is determined as
si(λ) = arg max
x∈R+
λx− ci(x) = c˙−1i (λ)
2) Consumers: Each consumer j in the set of consumers
D is endowed with a utility function vj(·) : R 7→ R and a
time-varying, memory-based consumption model uj , which
is either a function of the current price λk, the previous price
λk−1, and the previous consumption uk−1 (Section III-B), or
just of the prices λk and λk−1 (Section III-A). This is a de-
viation from common practice, as we explicitly include price
and consumption memory into users’ consumption policies,
as opposed to static consumption models that determine the
consumption as the inverse of the derivative of the utility
function evaluated at the current price (e.g. [13], [14]).
3) Independent System Operator: The ISO’s task is to
solve the economic dispatch problem [15], i.e. to ensure
supply follows demand at all times while minimizing trans-
mission cost subject to transmission, capacity, and congestion
constraints. For ease of exposition, we assume zero resistive
losses, infinite capacity limits, and the absence of congestion
in this paper. For an analysis of market operation under these
constraints, the reader is referred to [16].
Under the above assumptions, the ISO’s optimization
problem at each time step can be formulated as
maximize
{uj}j∈D,{si}i∈S
∑
j∈D
vj(uj)−
∑
i∈S
ci(si)
subject to
∑
j∈D
uj =
∑
i∈S
si
(1)
where we have dropped time indices for notational ease. We
emphasize that (1) has to be solved at each time step.
(1) assumes that consumers announce their value functions
{vj}j∈D to the real-time wholesale market. However, this is
an unrealistic assumption particularly for small consumers.
Instead, we analyze the market setting in which the value
functions are unknown (similar to [17]). Further, we adopt
the Representative Agent Model [18] to reduce the set of
consumers D and suppliers S to a singleton each, thereby
implicitly assuming that all consumers and suppliers act such
that the sum of their choices is equivalent to the individuals’
decisions. This simplification allows for an analysis of the
aggregate supply and demand dynamics rather than their
microscopic evolutions. Let c and v denote the representa-
tive cost and value functions, respectively, u the aggregate
demand, and s the aggregate supply. Lastly, since the set of
value functions {vj}j∈D is now unknown to the ISO, the
aggregate demand uˆ has to be predicted by the ISO, which
is assumed to be constant over each time interval. With the
above-mentioned assumptions, (1) reduces to
min
s
c(s) s.t. uˆ = s (2)
whose solution is simply c(uˆ) with associated unit price of
electricity λ = c˙(uˆ).
B. Real-Time Supply-Demand Model
Figure 1 depicts the closed loop dynamical system that
determines the temporal evolution of supply and demand,
coordinated by the price, which emerges under an ex-ante
pricing system. Under ex-ante pricing, the ISO at time k
determines the wholesale price before the next time k + 1
based on the predicted consumption, uˆk+1. In this scenario,
the gap between the predicted consumption uˆk+1 and the
actual consumption uk+1 results in a price difference be-
tween the ex-ante price λk+1, based on which the consumer
demands electricity, and the actual price that materializes
only after the consumption uk+1 does, which is the price the
supplier is reimbursed at. This gap could be either positive
or negative, and the risk associated with it is assumed by
the ISO. In [11], the authors show that an ex-post pricing
system, where the wholesale price λk+1 is determined only
after the consumption uk+1 materializes, leads to identical
price and consumption dynamics, but unlike ex-ante pricing,
the consumer has to bear price uncertainty.
The electricity price λ is now an endogenous process as
it depends on the observed consumption. At time k, λk is
declared to the consumer and elicits a myopic adjustment
of consumption based on her consumption model, which we
assume to be time-varying and with memory ((6) or (9)). For
completeness, a static utility function could be used, and the
interested reader is referred to [11], [17] for a theoretical
treatment of that case.
III. ELECTRICITY CONSUMPTION MODELS
In this Section, we derive consumption models with
memory by casting the energy consumption as an inventory
problem [19]. Suppose the consumer seeks the optimal
policy to minimize cost over a given horizon with n slotted
intervals, which are indexed as k = 0, . . . , n − 1. Denote
uˆk+1 = uk
λk+1 = c˙(uˆk+1)
uk+1 =

(10), static
(6), price memory
(9), price + cons. memory
λ
u
Fig. 1: Closed-Loop Feedback System Between Suppliers and Consumers
the price per unit of electricity at time k as λk, which is
assumed to be an exogenous, random process. At time k,
λk is announced to the consumer. The electricity demand
at interval k is denoted by dk, assumed to be known in
advance, and shiftable (elastic) such that it can be satisfied
in the periods [k, . . . , n−1]. The possibility to shift demand
creates a backlog xk ≤ 0, which denotes the amount of
unsatisfied energy at interval k. Further, let uk ≥ 0 denote
the consumption withdrawn from the grid at interval k, and
assume there is no storage, but the option to sell back
energy to the grid at price λk. With the terminal constraint
xn = 0, the solution to this inventory problem is given as
the minimizer of (3).
minimize
u0,...,un−1
Eλ1,...,λn−1
[
n−1∑
k=0
λkuk + p(xk+1) + h(uk, dk)
]
subject to xk+1 = xk + uk − dk (3)
xk ≤ 0
xn = 0
In (3), h(·, ·) : R+×R+ 7→ R+ is a cost term that penalizes
deviations of the actual consumption uk from the demand
dk, and p(·) : R− 7→ R+ the backlog penalty function. We
make the following
Assumption 2. h and p are strictly convex in their first
argument.
We note that the cost function in (3) satisfies the Bellman
equation:
J∗k = min
uk
λkuk + p(xk+1) + h(uk, dk)
+ Eλk+1,...,λn−1
[
J∗k+1
]
.
(4)
J∗k denotes the k-step optimal cost-to-go. This allows us to
derive the optimal consumption decision u∗k at any given
time k to construct consumption models which contain
memory about past prices and decisions. In Section III-A, we
explicitly solve (4) for the case h ≡ 0 to obtain the optimal
consumption u∗, an approximation of which is used in a
subsequent stability analysis. A closed-form solution to (4)
for h 6= 0 does not exist, and so we express the consumption
model in terms of the value function in Section III-B.
For a solution with linear, time-specific backlog penalties,
h(uk, dk) ≡ 0, and no sell-back option to the grid (i.e.
uk ≥ 0), the reader is referred to [13] and the references
therein.
A. Consumption Model with Price Memory
First, we consider the case h ≡ 0 in (3). We show that
this leads to a consumption model with price memory, but
no consumption memory. The optimization problem at any
given time k is formulated as
J∗k = min
uk
λkuk + p(xk+1) + Eλk+1,...,λn−1
[
J∗k+1
]
s.t. xk+1 = xk + uk − dk
Assumption 3. At any given time k, the consumer assumes
E [λk+1] = λk, k = 0, . . . , n− 2.
Theorem 1. With Assumption 3, the optimal consumption
and cost-to-go are given by
u∗n−k = dn−k − p˙−1
(
λn−k − λn−k−1
k − 1
)
(5a)
J∗n−k = (k − 1) · p
(
xn−k − p˙−1
(
λn−k − λn−k−1
k − 1
))
+ λn−k
(
n−1∑
i=n−k
di − xn−k
)
(5b)
for k = 2, . . . , n in (5a) and k = 1, . . . , n in (5b). For k = 1,
the optimal consumption is u∗n−1 = dn−1 − xn−1.
Note that due to Assumption 2, p˙(·) and p˙−1(·) are well-
defined. We see that u∗k is a function not only of the current
price λk, but also of the previous one λk−1.
Due to the time-varying nature of the optimal consumption
(5a), we make a simplification and approximate u∗n−k as a
time-invariant function
u∗n−k = dn−k − p˙−1(λn−k − λn−k−1) (6)
B. Model with Price and Consumption Memory
In this Section, we model h(uk, dk) as a cost term that
penalizes the squared difference of their arguments:
h(uk, dk) = ρ(uk − dk)2 (7)
where ρ ≥ 0 is a scalar weight. The k-step optimization at
time k is
min
uk
λkuk + p(xk+1) + h(uk, dk) + Eλk+1,...,λn−1
[
J∗k+1
]
s.t. xk+1 = xk + uk − dk
Unlike the previous consumption model (Section III-A),
closed-form expressions for the optimal consumption u∗k
and cost-to-go J∗k do not exist in this case. We there-
fore approximate the optimal consumption by first defining
p(xk+1) + J
∗
k+1 =: Vk+1(xk+1) and then solving the first
order optimality condition with respect to u∗k
0 = λk + 2ρ(uk − dk) + dVk+1(xk+1)
dxk+1
dxk+1
duk
(8)
where we make the following
Assumption 4. V is a quadratic function, i.e. V˙ −1(x) =
V˜ (x) is linear.
Assumption 4 can be justified with Assumption 5 and
the fact that J∗k+1 can be approximated as a quadratic
function. Then V is the sum of two quadratic functions. With
Assumption 4, (8) becomes
xk+1 = V˜ (2ρ(dk − uk)− λk) = xk + uk − dk
Solving for uk and replacing xk yields
u∗k =
dk + V˜ (λk−1 − λk + 2ρ(dk − dk−1 + uk−1)
2ρV˜ + 1
(9)
Thus, u∗k is a function of the current price λk, the previous
price λk−1, and previous consumption uk−1, and so the
consumption model has price and consumption memory.
IV. ANALYSIS OF MARKET STABILITY
A. Stability Under Static Consumption Model
We assume a static utility and cost function of the con-
sumer and producer, respectively. Under ex-ante pricing, the
price dynamics are
λk+1 = c˙(uˆk+1) = c˙(v˙
−1(λk)) (10)
(10) is a nonlinear difference equation, and a closed loop
solution, in general, does not exist. Theoretical statements
about the Lyapunov stability of this system have been made
in [11], [17].
B. Stability Under Consumption Model with Price Memory
Here we use consumption model (6) to analyze market
dynamics. The price dynamics are
λk+1 = c˙(uˆk+1) = c˙(uk)
= c˙
(
p˙−1(−λk)− p˙−1(−λk−1) + dk
)
.
(11)
(11) is nonlinear and thus cannot be solved explicitly
except for special cases. One such case which allows to make
quantitative statements without numerical simulations arises
under the following assumptions:
Assumption 5. p(·) : R− 7→ R+ is a quadratic function.
Assumption 6. c(·) : R+ 7→ R+ is a quadratic function.
While Assumptions 5 and 6 appear to be strong, they
maintain generality in that they capture the natural fact of
increasing marginal cost and constitute the simplest approx-
imation to other nonlinear, convex cost functions. We can
now write (11) as follows:
λk+1 =
(
c˙ ◦ p˙−1) (−λk)−(c˙ ◦ p˙−1) (−λk−1)+ c˙(dk) (12)
Let c(x) := αx2 ∴ c˙(x) = 2αx, p(x) := βx2 ∴ p˙−1(x) =
1
2βx, α, β 6= 0, and ε := α/β > 0. Then the price and
consumption dynamics are
λk = −α
β
λk−1 +
α
β
λk−2 + 2αdk (13a)
uk =
1
2β
(λk−1 − λk) + dk (13b)
Equation (13a) is a linear, non-homogeneous difference equa-
tion in the price λ which can be readily solved for selected
dk. We analyze two such cases - constant and sinusoidal
demand - in the following.
Theorem 2 (Stability under Consumption Model with Price
Memory). The price dynamics under a consumption model
with price memory are stable if and only if 0 ≤ ε < 1/2.
Theorem (2) translates to the fact that the price dynamics
(13a) are stable if and only if the marginal production cost
of electricity is less than half the marginal backlog disutility.
1) Constant Demand: For the case of constant demand
dk = d ∀k, and assuming that the price and consumption
converge to fixed points, these can be determined directly
from (13a) and (13b):
(λ∗, u∗) = (2αd, d) (14)
Theorem 3. The price dynamics under the consumption
model with price memory are
λk = c1x
k
1 + c2x
k
2 + 2αd. (15)
where the constants c1 and c2 are determined from initial
conditions.
Figure 2 shows the evolution of prices (13a) and consump-
tion for ε = 0.48 < 0.5, which is a stable system, and for
ε = 0.51 > 0.5, which results in an unstable system.
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Fig. 2: Evolution of Prices and Consumption, Constant Demand, β = 4,
α = 1.92 (Stable) or α = 2.04 (Unstable). Initial Conditions λ0 = λ1 = 3
2) Variable Demand: We model a variable demand curve
as a sinusoid of period 12 hours, such that every day exhibits
two full periods, see Figure 3. Let
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D
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Fig. 3: Variable Demand Function Modeled as Sinusoid (16)
2αdk = µ+A sin
(
(k − 5)pi
6
)
(16)
be the 12-hour periodic demand with mean µ and amplitude
A, and let k denote the hour of the day. As a consequence,
the peak demand is attained at k = 8 or k = 20, whereas the
minima are at k = 14 and k = 2. This simplified load shape
is an approximation of one of the most common residential
load shapes with a double peak as identified in [20]. Solving
(13a) and (13b) yields Theorem 4.
Theorem 4. The price dynamics under the consumption
model with price and consumption memory are
λk = c1x
k
1 + c2x
k
2 + µ +
e1 sin
(
(k − 5)pi
6
)
+ e2 cos
(
(k − 5)pi
6
)
.
(17)
where the constants c1 and c2 are determined from initial
conditions. e1 and e2 are
e1 =
1 + ε(
√
3− 1)/2
1 + (
√
3− 1)ε+ (2−√3)ε2A
e2 =
ε(1−√3)/2
1 + (
√
3− 1)ε+ (2−√3)ε2A
Theorem 5. For ε = α/β < 1/2 and k → ∞, the price
trajectory converges to the limiting function
λk
k→∞−−−−→ µ+
√
e21 + e
2
2 · sin
(
(k − 5)pi
6
+
pi
3
+ arctan
(
e2 −
√
3e1√
3e2 + e1
)) (18)
Thus, as ε increases, the magnitude of the resulting
limiting sinusoid decreases, and we observe an additional
negative phase shift, which translates into the fact that the
prices as well as the consumption show a lagging behavior.
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of the Limiting Sinusoid
Figure 5 shows the evolution of prices (17) for ε = 0.48 <
0.5, which is a stable system, and for ε = 0.51 > 0.5,
which results in an unstable system. It is clearly seen that the
stable price trajectory with ε = 0.48 converges to a limiting
sinusoid with the same mean, but a smaller magnitude (≈
0.84 ·A) than the scaled demand 2αdk, see Figure 4.
C. Stability Under Consumption Model with Price and Con-
sumption Memory
Here, we consider (9) as a consumption model. As in the
previous case, let c(x) := αx2 ∴ c˙(x) = 2αx, and V (x) :=
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Fig. 5: Evolution of Prices and Consumption, Variable Demand, β = 4, α =
1.92 (Stable) or α = 2.04 (Unstable). Initial Conditions λ0 = 2, λ1 = 3
γx2 ∴ V˙ −1(x) = 12γx = V˜ x, α, γ 6= 0. Let ε˜ := α/γ.
Then the following coupled system establishes a dynamical
system for the evolution of prices and consumption:
uk =
dk + V˜ (λk−1 − λk + 2ρ(dk − dk−1 + uk−1))
1 + 2ρV˜
(19a)
λk+1 = c˙(uˆk+1) = 2αuk (19b)
Eliminating uk and uk−1 from (19a) and (19b), we obtain
the following difference equation for the prices:
λk+1 =
ρ− α
γ + ρ
λk +
α
γ + ρ
λk−1+2αdk − 2αρ
γ + ρ
dk−1 (20)
Note that we recover (13a) for ρ = 0 and γ = β.
Theorem 6. Independently of ρ, (20) is stable for 0 ≤ α <
γ/2. For α ≥ γ/2, (20) is stable for ρ > α − γ/2 > 0, or
equivalently, ε˜ < 1/2 + ρ/γ.
Theorem 6 states that an appropriate choice of ρ can turn
unstable dynamics from the consumption model with price
memory only (namely for α ≥ γ/2) into a stable system.
1) Constant Demand: For the special case of constant
demand d, we obtain the following difference equation:
λk+1 =
ρ− α
γ + ρ
λk +
α
γ + ρ
λk−1 +
2αγ
γ + ρ
d. (21)
Assuming that the price converges, the fixed points λ∗
and u∗ obtained from (19a) and (19b) are identical to the
consumption model with price memory only (14).
Figure 6 shows the evolution of prices and the consump-
tion for α = 2.04, γ = 4.0 ⇒ ε˜ = 0.51 > 0.5. The
instability of the price and consumption evolution for ρ = 0
(which corresponds to the consumption model with pure
price memory) is consistent with the findings of Section IV-
B. However, any choice of ρ > α − γ/2 = 0.04 (Theorem
6) stabilizes the system (e.g. we chose ρ = 0.1), as is shown
in the figure.
With an appropriately chosen weight ρ, we further see
a flattening of the price and consumption evolution, and a
faster convergence towards the equilibria u∗ and λ∗, as is
shown in Figure 7.
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Fig. 6: Evolution of Prices and Consumption, Constant Demand, γ = 4,
α = 2.04, and ρ = 0 (Unstable) or ρ = 0.1 (Stable). Initial Conditions
λ0 = λ1 = 0
0 24 48 72 96
Hours
0.0
2.0
4.0
6.0
8.0
10.0
P
ri
ce
s
/
D
em
an
d
Price vs. Scaled Demand
Prices, ρ = 0.1, ε = 0.48
Prices, ρ = 0, ε = 0.48
Demand ·2α
0 24 48 72 96
Hours
0.0
0.5
1.0
1.5
2.0
2.5
C
on
su
m
pt
io
n
/
D
em
an
d
Consumption vs. Demand
Cons., ρ = 0.1, ε = 0.48
Cons., ρ = 0, ε = 0.48
Demand
Fig. 7: Evolution of Prices and Consumption, Constant Demand, γ = 4,
α = 2.04, and ρ = 0 (No Flattening) or ρ = 0.1 (With Flattening). Initial
Conditions λ0 = λ1 = 0
2) Variable Demand: The same qualitative findings as
under the constant demand approximation are found in this
case, that is, for increasing values of ρ = 0.1, there is a
flattening of the price and consumption evolution as well as
a faster convergence towards the limiting sinusoid.
V. CONCLUSION
We proposed realistic electricity consumption models with
price and consumption memory by using dynamic program-
ming on a suitably defined inventory problem of the elastic
demand over the consumption horizon of a user. These dy-
namic consumption models were then analyzed in a closed-
loop real-time market setting with representative agents
for supply and demand under the assumption of quadratic
generation costs and backlog disutilities, and the resulting
electricity price and demand evolution were investigated
for stability and dynamic properties. For the consumption
model with price memory only, we showed that prices
remain stable if the marginal generation cost is less than
half of the marginal backlog disutility of the consumers. In
addition, by penalizing deviations from required demand in
the consumption model with price and consumption memory,
this ratio could be increased beyond 1/2, with the additional
effect of faster convergence towards the equilibrium price.
Our analyses could be used as a preliminary guidepost
for the design of real-time pricing mechanisms to diminish
the justifiable reluctance of ratepayers towards adoption of
real-time pricing. For a more confident analysis, however,
Assumptions 1-6, the Representative Agent Theorem, and the
absence of transmission, capacity, and congestion constraints
would need to be removed. The price dynamics in a resulting
network of users is subject to future research.
We are currently working on a contractual formulation
between load serving entities and end-users for real-time
pricing mechanisms in a Demand Response setting with the
goal to find optimal bidding strategies into the wholesale
electricity market, which is a direct continuation of the work
described in this paper.
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APPENDIX
Proof of Theorem 1
For k = 1, the terminal constraint xn = 0 forces the
optimal consumption to be u∗n−1 = dn−1−xn−1. The k = 1
cost-to-go is then obtained as
J∗n−1 = min
un−1
[λn−1un−1 + p(xn)] = λn−1(dn−1 − xn−1),
which equals (5b) for k = 1. For k = n − 2, we need to
solve
J∗n−2 = min
un−2
λn−2un−2 + p(xn−1) + Eλn−1
[
J∗n−1
]
s.t. xn−1 = xn−2 + un−2 − dn−2
With J∗n−1 and Assumption 3, the first order optimality
condition is
0 = λn−2 +
dp(xn−1)
dxn−1
dxn−1
dun−2
− E[λn−1]
xn−1 = p˙−1
E [λn−1]− λn−2︸ ︷︷ ︸
=0
 = xn−2 + un−2 − dn−2
u∗n−2 = p˙
−1(−λn−2 + λn−3) + dn−2 (22)
(22) is identical to (5a) for k = 2. The n − 2 cost-to-go is
found by plugging (22) back into the cost function, and is
identical to (5b) for k = 2. With k = 2 as the base case, we
proceed to the induction step at n − k − 1: Solving for the
optimal consumption u∗n−k−1 in
J∗n−k−1 = min
un−k−1
λn−k−1un−k−1 + p(xn−k) + EJ∗n−k
s.t. xn−k = xn−k−1 + un−k−1 − dn−k−1
yields
0 = λn−k−1 +
d(p(xn−k) + Jn−k)
dxn−k
dxn−k
dun−k−1
xn−k = p˙−1 ((E[λn−k]− λn−k−1)/k)
= xn−k−1 + un−k−1 − dn−k−1
u∗n−k−1 = dn−k−1 − p˙−1 ((λn−k − λn−k−1)/k) (23)
Plugging (23) into the cost function yields, after simplifica-
tions and Assumption 3,
J∗n−k−1 = λn−k−1dn−k−1
+ k · p (xn−k−1 − p˙−1((λn−k−1 − λn−k−2)/k)
+ E [λn−k]
(
n−1∑
i=n−k
di − xn−k−1
)
J∗n−k−1 = k · p
(
xn−k−1 − p˙−1((λn−k−1 − λn−k−2)/k
)
+ λn−k−1
(
n−1∑
i=n−k−1
di − xn−k−1
)
(24)
(23) and (24) are (5a) and (5b) evaluated at n − k − 1,
respectively, which completes the induction step and the
proof.
Proof of Theorem 2
The characteristic equation of the homogeneous portion is
x2 + εx− ε = 0
and the roots are
x1,2 =
−ε
2
±
√
ε(ε+ 4)
2
(25)
and so we see that the roots are always real valued and of
magnitude less than 1 if and only if 0 ≤ ε < 1/2, which is
the condition for stability.
Proof of Theorem 3
The homogeneous solution to (13a) can be found by
solving for the roots of its characteristic equation
λ2 +
α
β
λ− α
β
= 0
Combining the homoegeneous solution with the particular
solution λp = 2αd yields (15).
Proof of Theorem 4
A particular solution to the price dynamics can be found
with the guess
bk = e0 + e1 sin
(
(k − 5)pi
6
)
+ e2 cos
(
(k − 5)pi
6
)
. (26)
(26) needs to solve (13a), i.e.
bk + εbk−1 − εbk−2 = µ+A sin
(
(k − 5)pi
6
)
Using the trigonometric identities
sin(α+ β) = sinα cosβ + cosα sinβ (27a)
cos(α+ β) = cosα cosβ − sinα sinβ (27b)
the coefficients e0, e1, e2 of the particular solution can be
determined as
e0 = µ (28)
e1 =
1 + ε(
√
3− 1)/2
1 + (
√
3− 1)ε+ (2−√3)ε2A (29)
e2 =
ε(1−√3)/2
1 + (
√
3− 1)ε+ (2−√3)ε2A (30)
Proof of Theorem 5
For ε < 1/2, we have that |x1|, |x2| < 1, and so if k goes
to infinity, the first two terms in (17) go to zero. Using the
following identity [21]
A cos(ωt+ α) +B sin(ωt+ α) =
√
A2 +B2 ×
cos
(
ωt+ arctan
(
A sinα−B cosα
A cosα+B sinα
))
on (17), together with sin(x + pi/2) = cos(x) and cos(x −
pi/2) = sin(x), and noting that e2 < 0, as is shown in Figure
4, (18) is readily obtained.
Proof of Theorem 6
The stability and the dynamic behavior of (20) can be
checked by analyzing the characteristic equation, i.e.
x2 − ρ− α
γ + ρ
x− α
γ + ρ
= 0
The roots to the characteristic equation are
x1,2 =
ρ− α±√(ρ− α)2 + 4α(γ + ρ)
2(γ + ρ)
. (31)
Stability is guaranteed if and only if the roots x1, x2 to
(31) have magnitude less than 1. First we analyze x2. The
values of ρ for which x2 < 1 are determined:
(ρ− α)− 2(γ + ρ) < −
√
(ρ− α)2 + 4α(γ + ρ) (32)
((ρ− α)− 2(γ + ρ))2 > (ρ− α)2 + 4α(γ + ρ)
α+ γ > α
Note that both sides of (32) are negative, which forces an
inequality switch. The last inequality is valid for all ρ, and
so x2 is always < 1 for all values of ρ.
Second, we find the value of ρ for which x1 = −1:
x1 =
ρ− α−√(ρ− α)2 + 4α(γ + ρ)
2(γ + ρ)
= −1 (33)
ρ = α− γ/2
We have seen that in this case, for ρ = 0, the system is
stable (see Section IV-B.1). Also, note that the “left” root x1
is always smaller than the “right” root, i.e. x1 ≤ x2, and so
x1 lower bounds x2. Take the derivative of x1 w.r.t. ρ:
dx1
dρ
=
1
2
(γ + ρ)
−2
(γ + ρ)
(
1− ρ+ α√
(ρ+ α)2 + 4αγ
)
︸ ︷︷ ︸
≥0
+
√
(ρ− α)2 + 4α(γ + ρ)− (ρ− α)︸ ︷︷ ︸
≥0
 ≥ 0.
Thus, the left root is monotonely nondecreasing in ρ, and
we can take the limit of (33):
lim
ρ→∞x1 = (1−
√
1)/2 = 0.
Thus, x1 = −1 for ρ = α − γ/2, and for increasing values
of ρ, x1 approaches the value of zero. As x1 lower bounds
x2 and −1 < x1 ≤ x2 < 1 for ρ ≥ α − γ/2, stability is
found if and only if ρ ≥ α− γ/2. Note that if α < γ/2, the
system is always stable due to ρ > 0.
